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INTRODUCTION
“Vaccine equity is the challenge of our time… And we are failing.”
- Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the WHO
The response to the COVID-19 pandemic has produced one of the fastest
vaccine developments in history, but it has also been a global wake-up call that
vaccine development and distribution processes need improvement. By March
3, 2021, roughly three months after vaccine distribution had begun, only 3.54%
of the world’s population had received a COVID-19 vaccine.1 Israel had
vaccinated 52% of its population, and many other countries had yet to receive
any vaccine doses.2 The United States had vaccinated only about 18% of its
population.3 Vaccines are a critical factor in achieving global public health.4
They are extremely economical when considering the reduced cost of healthcare
and harm to society.5 Furthermore, the nature of vaccines requires that a large
percentage of the population be inoculated to truly eliminate a disease; as such,
vaccines offer an opportunity to reduce a population’s inequity that may
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Notre Dame Law School 2022. Bachelor in East Asian Studies with a
concentration in Chinese, University of Michigan, 2016. I would like to thank Professor Mary Ellen
O’Connell for her support and encouragement during my research and throughout the writing process.
I would also like to thank the Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law for their
review of this note in preparation for publication.
1 Hannah Ritchie et al., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations, OUR WORLD IN DATA,
https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations (last updated Mar. 4, 2021); A Timeline of COVID-19
Developments in 2020, AJMC (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19developments-in-2020.
2 Id.; see also ‘Wildly unfair’: UN says 130 countries have not received a single Covid vaccine dose,
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2021, 7:55 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/18/wildlyunfair-un-says-130-countries-have-not-received-a-single-covid-vaccine-dose.
3 Ritchie et al., supra note 1.
4 The World Health Organization has defined “health” as “a state of complete physical, mental and
social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” WHO Remains Firmly
Committed to the Principles Set Out in the Preamble to the Constitution, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/about/governance/constitution (last visited Feb. 14, 2022). However, this
definition has not changed since 1948 and there have been calls to redefine health. See generally Ido
Badash et al., Redefining Health: The Evolution of Health Ideas from Antiquity to the Era of ValueBased Care, 9 CUREUS 1, 1 (2017).
5 Ana S. Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines: Takeaways From Recent Infectious
Disease Outbreaks, 118 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 170, 173 (2020).
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otherwise be multiplied by disease.6 However, the magnitude of the potential
impact of vaccines is also detrimental to their success. Vaccines are a form of
preventative medicine, which means there is no real sense of demand by the
market until it is too late. Vaccines are expensive to research, discover, and
produce, which limits companies’ desire to develop them. There are many legal
questions surrounding the development of vaccines, including intellectual
property topics such as patentability and how it affects wide-scale public benefit,
as well as questions regarding the process of legal recourse against
manufacturers in the event of an adverse reaction. In short, vaccines are both a
risky and expensive business that offers a conditional or limited return on
investment. As we create a more interdependent and densely populated world,
we become more vulnerable to the spread of disease, which puts our global
health in jeopardy. But we also have an opportunity to oversee the challenges of
global public health by operating above the individual needs of countries.
International organizations can create a system of vaccine development,
regulation, and production. The next step for global public health may start with
an organization dedicated to regulating and distributing vaccinations
internationally.
The structure of this Note aims to provide a large-scale picture of the current
state of vaccine development and distribution, shed light on major challenges
and problems, and propose an overarching solution. In order to understand the
present status of vaccine regulation and before discussing the challenge of global
distribution, Part I provides an overview of vaccine history and describes the
regulatory trends that have taken place within the U.S. over the years. The
pharmaceutical industry and U.S. legislation have allowed public health
strategies to be placed into the hands of profit-driven companies. Part I also
shows the ways that government regulation has incentivized and altered the
relationship between the private sector and the public sector in vaccine
development. Part II looks at the way that the COVID-19 pandemic has
necessitated an increase in direct government funding, and it further explains the
importance of government involvement in the development of vaccines on a
national level. Part III then turns to the international stage and emphasizes the
limitations of domestic government involvement. It considers relevant existing
international organizations involved in vaccine production and distribution and
points out areas of weakness. Finally, this Note proposes the creation of an
authoritative body, likely within an existing organization, that has binding legal
power regarding the development and distribution of vaccines.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF VACCINE REGULATION

Vaccines are not a novel discovery, and they have always generated
questions about property rights. Evidence shows the first ideas for vaccines
surfaced as early as medieval China or 17th century Turkey.7 In the 18th century,
Edward Jenner developed the first successful vaccine against smallpox by
introducing a version of the virus found in animals to the system of a healthy 86 See generally Ana S. Rutschman, Article: Vaccine Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 729,
731 (2019).
7 Rutschman, supra note 6, at 736.

2022

THE COVID-19 VACCINE: A SPOTLIGHT ON DISTRIBUTION CHALLENGES

59

year-old boy.8 Shortly after, American physician Benjamin Waterhouse
attempted to achieve property rights in the vaccine.9 This attempt at a monopoly
was largely through physical control and refusal to sell to other physicians, and
his attempts failed after demand became too great and individuals began
importing materials from England.10 Vaccines continued to develop over the
next few centuries, and one of the first major vaccines to be created as we know
them today was in response to the Polio pandemic in America. At the time, in
part because of the novelty of vaccines and the influence of the vaccine’s creator,
American virologist Jonas Salk, there was a noble intention that the vaccine
would operate as a gift to the world.11 Salk recognized that the vaccine was only
possible due to private donations and wanted the benefits of vaccines to be
accessible by all. When asked who owned the patents he famously answered,
“There is no patent. Could you patent the sun?”12 But twenty-five years later, in
1980, the Supreme Court held that one essentially could patent the sun in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty.13 It held that vaccines, which often require living
organisms to be created or processed, are patentable.14 Regulation has impacted
the way that vaccine development is incentivized and caused noble intentions
like that of Jonas Salk to become all but extinct in vaccine development.15
To understand the development of vaccine law, it is important to understand
the current process of vaccine development. The process of developing a vaccine
today is a long and difficult road, with many potential barriers to success. The
process is complex, often lasting ten to fifteen years and requiring private and
public sector participation.16 For about a century now, the federal government
8 Id. at 735.
9 Id. at 736.
10 Benjamin Waterhouse, ONVIEW: DIGITAL COLLECTIONS & EXHIBITS,
http://collections.countway.harvard.edu/onview/exhibits/show/to-slay-the-devouringmonster/benjamin-waterhouse. The smallpox vaccine would not become the vaccine as we know it
today until 1980.; Rutschman, supra note 6, at 735.
11 Ruby Mellen, Vaccines have never been distributed equally. A coronavirus vaccine would be no
different, history suggests, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/11/12/vaccine-distribution-history-coronavirus-h1n1h5n1/.
12 Sophie Ochmann & Max Roser, Polio, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://ourworldindata.org/polio.
13 Rutschman, supra note 6, at 744. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
14 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (US) DIVISION OF HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION,
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF VACCINE INNOVATION AND MANUFACTURING 51 (1985). This has been
recognized as essentially the start of the biotech industry, promising biotech companies and investors
that the value of their technology would be recognized. Gene Quinn, June 16, 2010: 30th Anniversary
of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, IP WATCH DOG (June 16, 2010),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/06/16/june-16-2010-30th-anniversary-of-diamond-vchakrabarty/id=11268/.
15 This is not to say that there should not be any patents available for vaccine-related developments.
The circumstances around Jonas Salk’s polio vaccine were unique in that so many people donated to
the organization (the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis) that “patenting it for profit would
have represented double charging.” Brian Palmer, Jonas Salk: Good at Virology, Bad at Economics,
SLATE (Apr. 13, 2014, 9:21 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2014/04/the-real-reasons-jonas-salkdidnt-patent-the-polio-vaccine.html. Secondly, though this did not influence Salk’s famous statement,
the organization’s lawyers found that an application for a patent would have failed and therefore did
not ever apply. Id.
16 Vaccine Development, Testing, and Regulation, HISTORY OF VACCINES,
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/vaccine-development-testing-and-regulation (last
updated Jan. 17, 2018). The quickest development of a vaccine on record, prior to COVID-19, is the
mumps vaccine. Merck scientist Maurice Hilleman began working on a vaccine when his daughter
was infected with mumps in March of 1963, gaining FDA approval just four years later in 1967.
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has played an important role in regulating, licensing, and funding vaccines.17 In
the US, Congress passed its first regulatory legislation regarding the quality of
“viruses, serums, toxins, and analogous products,” in 1902 with the Biologics
Control Act.18 The act created what would eventually become the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), and also gave the government control over the
institutions creating vaccines.19 The regulatory authority of the NIH would be
transferred to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) upon its creation in
1972. In the European Union, the European Medicines Agency operates as the
vaccine regulatory institution.20 Other similar FDA counterparts include the
National Medical Products Administration in China, the Taiwan Food and Drug
Agency (TFDA) in Taiwan, the Federal Commission for the Protection Against
Sanitary Risks in Mexico, and the Health Products and Food Branch in Canada.21
The World Health Organization has also published recommendations for the
standards of biological products, which most states adopt on national levels.22
The most important federal organization for health in the United States is the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC is unique because
it does not have a primary statute that created it since it was a result of executive
action as a war-time agency in 1942.23 There are, however, specific statutes that
delegate certain duties to the CDC, such as issuing federal quarantine orders.24
The regulatory process for vaccine development is somewhat similar
internationally.25 The International Council for Harmonisation of Technical
Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) aims to harmonize and
somewhat standardize the regulatory systems between countries.26 In the U.S.,
the process begins with research and exploration, which lasts about two to four
years.27 In order to fund the process, private organizations often accept funding
from the government or academic institutions.28 This process is followed by the
pre-clinical stage, which often lasts one to two years, and consists of animal
testing to determine the most effective dose and safest method of
administration.29 Once a research group believes it has a safe and effective
vaccine, regulatory testing begins with an application for an Investigational New
David E. Sanger et al., Profits and Pride at Stake, the Race for a Vaccine Intensifies, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/02/us/politics/vaccines-coronavirus-research.html (last updated
May 20, 2020).
17 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE (US) COMMITTEE ON THE EVALUATION OF VACCINE PURCHASE FINANCING
IN THE UNITED STATES, FINANCING VACCINES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ASSURING ACCESS AND
AVAILABILITY (2003).
18 Vaccine Development, Testing, and Regulation, supra note 16.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Regulatory Resources, PARENTERAL DRUG ASS’N, https://www.pda.org/scientific-and-regulatoryaffairs/regulatory-resources/global-regulatory-authority-websites (last visited Feb. 14, 2022).
22 Vaccine Development, Testing, and Regulation, supra note 16.
23 Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Institutionalizing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s
Independence, 12 CONLAWNOW 107, 110 (2020).
24 Id. at 111.; See 42 C.F.R. §§ 70–71.
25 Part of the reason for these similarities is that the FDA has been able to act as a regulatory model as
a result of its earlier establishment, and the FDA has made a significant effort over the last few
decades to expand its outreach globally. FDA Goes Global, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Feb.
2006), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fdas-evolving-regulatory-powers/fda-goes-global.
26 See generally ICH, MISSION, https://www.ich.org/page/mission.
27 Vaccine Development, Testing, and Regulation, supra note 16, at 3.
28 Id.
29 Id. However, this is the stage at which many research studies fail. Id. It is estimated that only 6% of
projects to develop a vaccine ever succeed. Sanger, Kirkpatrick, et al., supra note 16, at 3–4.
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Drug (IND) through the FDA.30 Within thirty days, the institution that plans to
conduct the clinical trials will review the application. If accepted, the institution
will begin three phases of clinical trials, beginning in a small group of adults and
progressing to tens of thousands of people.31 If a vaccine developer successfully
passes these trials, a Biologics License Application will then be submitted to the
FDA.32 The FDA will investigate the factory and vaccine labeling before license
approval, and continue to monitor the production, quality, and safety of the
vaccine.33 At its discretion, the FDA may decide to conduct its own testing,
known as Phase IV Trials.34 In an attempt to further regulate safety, the CDC
and FDA created The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) in
1990, which is a voluntary and public reporting system open to anyone that
suspects an association between an adverse event and a vaccination.35
Once vaccines are ready to go to market in the U.S., they are often purchased
in large quantities by the government.36 In a pandemic situation such as the
COVID-19 crisis, this is especially true as a result of the lack of availability to
smaller buyers such as insurance companies and hospitals.37 Vaccines fall into
the class of biologics, which usually enjoy a very high value and price.38
However, government programs buy these vaccines in large quantities and
therefore often at a discounted price. The significance of that discount may be
due to the contractual promise to manufacturers that the government will
continue to purchase the vaccine, eliminating some of the financial risk involved
in production.39 Another major challenge is that few manufacturers dare to
produce vaccines due to unprofitability, which means there is little room for
error and any setback can result in a vaccine shortage.40 Therefore, the
government is incentivized to buy in bulk, conditional on the realization of
supply, from multiple companies in order to ensure there is enough supply for
the population. Conversely, many developing countries are both unable to afford
a vaccine and unable to safely create their own. As a result, they rely on the
World Health Organization to first review and approve a vaccine, then grant
prequalification, which allows agencies such as the United Nations International
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) to purchase vaccines on behalf of these
countries that otherwise cannot afford them.41

30 Vaccine Development, Testing, and Regulation, supra note 16, at 4.
31 Id. at 4–5.
32 Id. at 5.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. VAERS receives approximately 30,000 reports every year. Immunization Policy Issues Overview,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 26, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/immunizations-policy-issues-overview.aspx.
36 Austin Frakt, Low Prices for Vaccines Can Come at a Great Cost, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/upshot/low-prices-for-vaccines-can-come-at-a-great-cost.html.
37 Other hindrances to purchase include the restrictions of the emergency use license granted by the
FDA regarding scope of authority, and the high maintenance storage requirements. See generally
https://www.fda.gov/media/144412/download.
38 Frakt, supra note 36, at 2.
39 Id.
40 Some diseases have a vaccine that is only manufactured by one company. Id. at 2.
41 Mansour Yaïch, Investing in vaccines for developing countries: how public–private partnerships can
confront neglected diseases, 5 HUMAN VACCINES 368, 368 (2009),
https://doi.org/10.4161/hv.5.6.8172.
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A. THE BEGINNING OF REGULATION
In 1955, in the wake of the polio epidemic, a failure in manufacturing caused
the polio vaccine to infect around 220,000 people with the virus, now known as
the Cutter Incident.42 This provided proof that the government needed to be
involved in the vaccine process and prompted a significant increase in
regulation. One of the most concerning aspects of this incident is that the
government, which was responsible for the licensing and approval of the
vaccine, was not aware of the problem until it was too late.43 In a quick response,
increased government regulation resulted in vaccine production becoming the
most regulated form of medicine, which remains true to this day.44 One of the
most important takeaways from this incident is that the pharmaceutical company
responsible, Cutter, was liable but without fault because it was found not to be
negligent.45 This resulted in Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, a case that
created precedent allowing for liability without fault.46 The aftermath of this case
made financial liability a real risk for pharmaceutical companies and restricted
willingness to enter the market.47 It is possible that this created a market that was
so unprofitable that it was difficult to enter, contributing to the oligopoly that
has often existed in vaccine production.48 However, government liability did not
exist in this case, which indicates that eliciting government funding was a more
viable option than private sector investment.
In the aftermath of the Cutter Incident, regulation quickly followed. In 1962,
the Vaccination Assistance Act became the first national immunization program
in the United States.49 Intended to allow the CDC to support vaccination
campaigns, it has remained one of the most important legislative instruments in
allowing federal funds to support vaccination programs.50 The federal
government made its first mass purchase of vaccines in the fiscal year of 1966,
obtaining the vaccines at a discounted price and then providing them directly to
state and local governments as opposed to grants.51 Section 317 of the Public
Health Service Act was enacted in 1972, which provided further grants to state
and local governments.52 Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the federal government
also took advantage of 28 U.S.C. § 1498, originally created in 1948, which
effectively allows the federal government to use a patented product as long as
42 Nathaniel L. Moir, To Boldly Remember Where We Have Already Been, 2 J. APPLIED HIST. 17, 27
(2020), https://brill.com/view/journals/joah/2/1-2/article-p17_2.xml.
43 Moir, supra note 42, at 26. It should also be noted that while the federal government was not legally
responsible for the incident, the director of the National Microbiological Institute was fired, and the
United States Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and the NIH Director both resigned,
indicating an understanding of responsibility. Id. at 27.
44 PAUL A. OFFIT, M.D., THE CUTTER INCIDENT: HOW AMERICA’S FIRST POLIO VACCINE LED TO THE
GROWING VACCINE CRISIS 178-179 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
45 See generally Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602 (1960).
46 OFFIT, supra note 44, at 179.
47 Moir, supra note 42, at 22.
48 See generally Immunization, Vaccines and Biologicals, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/immunization/programmes_systems/procurement/market/global_supply/en/ (last
visited Feb. 27, 2021).
49 Alan R. Hinman, Walter A. Orenstein, et al., Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR),
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Oct. 7, 2011),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su6004a9.htm.
50 Id.
51 ORIGINS AND RATIONALE OF IMMUNIZATION POLICY, supra note 17.
52 Id.
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the patent owner is reasonably compensated.53 This utilization has been entirely
forgotten in recent years, with the only notable usage as a threat during the
anthrax scare of 2001.54
Though not specific to vaccine regulation, patents are one of the main
sources that can encourage private investors to fund vaccine research and
development. A driving reason to develop a vaccine is the knowledge that no
one else will be able to copy the product. Patents are a strong incentive for
creating a vaccine, and a lack of patenting rights would undoubtedly deter
pharmaceutical companies from developing vaccines; however, patents also
create a barrier to entry in vaccine development.55 The arguments for and against
patents have always been that patents create incentives for research and
development by granting exclusive access to results, but also may weaken the
motivation to enter the field in the first place by keeping competitors in the
dark.56 Part of the reason the COVID-19 vaccine was developed so quickly was
because information was shared. In the U.S., patent incentives may have kept
this information from being publicly released for much longer than it was.
Chinese virologist Zhang Yong-Zhen bravely agreed to release the coronavirus
genome, despite an order from China’s National Health Commission not to
disclose any information regarding the virus to the public.57 This was a brave act
against the Chinese government by Zhang, but would this have been the same if
Zhang had any intellectual property rights to the genome or had been part of a
private company that did?58 It may be the case that the virus emerging in a
communist country, by eliminating private intellectual property rights, could
have been a benefit to global public health.59 If it were a U.S. company that
privately discovered the genome, it is questionable whether the genome would
have so quickly entered the public domain.
B. REAGAN REGULATION
During and around the Reagan Administration, a large push for regulation
in favor of the private sector resulted in the rise of what is known as Big Health
or Big Pharma.60 On the production side, one of the greatest hindrances to
vaccine development is that it is an unprofitable business, and this was an
53 Hannah Brennan et al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent
Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 275, 280 (2016).
54 Id.
55 Currently, companies are racing against each other to create the first COVID-19 vaccine because it
presents a very rare business opportunity for developers, especially if demand makes it a valued part
of standard immunizations globally. See generally Alan Story, A patented Covid-19 vaccine could
price out millions, GREEN WORLD (May 7, 2020), https://greenworld.org.uk/article/patented-covid19-vaccine-could-price-out-millions.
56 See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
57 Charlie Campbell, Exclusive: The Chinese Scientist Who Sequenced the First COVID-19 Genome
Speaks Out About the Controversies Surrounding His Work, TIME (Aug. 24, 2020, 10:07 PM),
https://time.com/5882918/zhang-yongzhen-interview-china-coronavirus-genome/.
58 See generally Misha Angrist & Robert M. Cook-Deegan, Who Owns the Genome?, THE NEW
ATLANTIS (2006), https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/who-owns-the-genome.
59 See generally Richard McGregor, How the state runs business in China, THE GUARDIAN (JULY 25,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/25/china-business-xi-jinping-communist-partystate-private-enterprise-huawei.
60 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Ending the Ronald Reagan lie, BOSTON GLOBE (July 11, 2017, 12:00 AM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/07/10/ending-ronald-reaganlie/RF3guIcPrjoZI3WWagT3rM/story.html.
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incentive that the federal government began to develop regulation to protect.
One of the most obvious reasons for low profitability in vaccine production is
the low demand that exists for such a preventative medicine. The only time the
demand increases is when a new disease creates a need, creating a panic that
results in demand beyond actual need.61 While this increase in demand may also
increase funding, that funding will decline as soon as a pandemic begins to
wane.62 In the past, companies that have invested in developing vaccines in
response to a public health crisis have suffered immense sunk costs after an
epidemic wanes and the need for a vaccine diminishes.63 Federal safety
regulations, though a benefit to society, also present a barrier to vaccine
innovation and increases production costs.64 Though the potential economic
value of vaccines is great, that value does not go into the hands of the developers
and manufacturers.65 Much of that economic value is in its preventative nature.
Another disincentive for developers is that the economic value of a vaccine is
such that many vaccines are one-time use, with long-lasting immunization.66 It
is not surprising, therefore, that more lucrative pharmaceuticals may be more
attractive to investors and developers.
Even when companies can profitably develop new drugs and vaccines, these
are often aimed toward treating chronic diseases in the wealthiest, most
industrialized countries.67 The treatment of infectious diseases in developing
countries is often the least profitable, for reasons such as low market returns,
distribution challenges, or lack of awareness, and is therefore neglected by
profit-driven companies.68 Even if there is a tangible disease with a foreseeable
spread in a developing or low-income country, preventative medicine is still not
economically valued enough for sponsors to want to invest in a disease that has
not yet arrived on domestic soil. One of the most illustrative examples of this is
in the Ebola outbreaks prior to 2014.69 One vaccine had been developed but
could not find a private investor to sponsor the clinical trials necessary for
regulatory approval. As a result, the vaccine was placed in storage and
untouched until the Ebola 2014-2016 outbreak.70 Reported to be 100% effective,
the vaccine likely could have prevented the epidemic if it had been administered
before or at the start of the outbreak.71 On the market side, because vaccine
production is largely a private sector endeavor, it is difficult to ensure affordable
prices for the public.72 Concerns about profitability are at odds with the
61 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF VACCINE INNOVATION AND MANUFACTURING, supra note 14.
62 Id.
63 Nicholas Florko, Major drug makers haven’t stepped up to manufacture NIH coronavirus vaccine,
top U.S. health official says, STAT (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/02/11/majordrug-makers-havent-stepped-up-to-manufacture-coronavirus-vaccine-top-u-s-health-official-says/.
See infra note 69–71 and accompanying text.
64 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF VACCINE INNOVATION AND MANUFACTURING , supra note 14.
65 Rutschman, supra note 5, at 173.
66 See also id. at 173, 175 (comparing the income of the measles vaccine after an outbreak, at $675
million, with the typical yearly income of diabetes treatment, at $6 billion per year, and the income of
cancer biologic Keytruda, which is expected to surpass $20 billion in income).
67 Craig Wheeler & Seth Berkley, Initial Lessons from Public-Private Partnerships in Drug and
Vaccine Development, 79 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 728 (2001).
68 Id.
69 Rutschman, supra note 5, at 176.
70 Id.
71 COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS, WHY WE EXIST,
https://cepi.net/about/whyweexist/ (last visited May 4, 2022)
72 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF VACCINE INNOVATION AND MANUFACTURING, supra note 14.
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accessibility of what many believe should be free vaccinations. This was seen in
the HIV-AIDS crisis in 1996 when an antiretroviral treatment became available,
but only for thousands of dollars per person.73 As a result, millions of people in
low-income countries like India and South Africa died before the treatment
became affordable.74
Another major problem for profitability has been the liability and risk that
is involved in the occurrence of adverse vaccine reactions. This presents legal
trouble for manufacturers. While legally considered “unavoidably unsafe,” there
is a question as to who should be responsible for such liabilities.75 Of course,
this is an issue that all pharmaceutical companies and companies in the business
of manufacturing medicine must face. However, this is possibly a reason for the
steep decline in vaccine suppliers over the years, going from over fifty licensed
American vaccine manufacturers in the 1940s, to less than ten by the late
1990s.76
One major contributor to the growth of Big Pharma was the return of the
Institutional Patent Agreement program in 1968, which allowed for monopolies
on licenses developed through funding by the NIH, as opposed to returning these
rights to the federal government.77 In 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act further allowed
private pharmaceutical companies to profit by broadening intellectual property
rights.78 Shortly after, the Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision would instill
newfound confidence in investors that the pharmaceutical industry could be a
lucrative venture. Other legislation that boosted the profitability of Big Pharma
include the 1983 Orphan Drug Act and the FDA Act of 1997.79 Now, if an
adverse reaction results in permanent damage, a claim can be filed with the
73 Story, supra note 55.
74 Id.
75 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment k (Am. L. Inst. 1965).
76 Rutschman, supra note 5, at 174–75. In the 1970s, a number of lawsuits were filed against vaccine
manufacturers for adverse reactions to vaccines. This caused the prices of vaccines to increase, and
several manufactures stopped producing all together. In an effort to address this situation, Congress
passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act in 1986, which offered compensation to
consumers on a “no fault” basis. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Overview,
History, and How the Safety Process Works,
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/ensuringsafety/history/index.html (Sept. 9, 2020). See generally,
42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-21 to -23 (1988). The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (NCVIP)
was established by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in 1988, which taxes
vaccine manufacturers $0.75 per vaccine dose for vaccines that are routinely given to children, as
well as some adult vaccines. This program allows an individual to claim an injury from a covered
vaccine, and presumes that events at issue are side effects of the vaccine as long as there is no other
cause to be found. Vaccine Injury Compensation Programs, THE HISTORY OF VACCINES,
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/vaccine-injury-compensation-programs (Jan. 17,
2018).
77 Alexander Zaitchik, How Big Pharma Was Captured by the One Percent, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June
28, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/149438/big-pharma-captured-one-percent.
78 The Act “promotes the use of federally funded inventions by small businesses and nonprofit
organizations . . . by allowing (1) nonprofit organizations such as universities to retain title to and
market the inventions they created using federal research funds and (2) federal agencies to grant
exclusive licenses for federally owned inventions to provide more incentive to businesses.” U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-98-126, Administration of the Bayh-Dole Act by Research
Universities (1998), https://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98126.pdf. It also authorizes the
government to exercise what are known as “march-in rights” by licensing a generic competitor if a
company funded by taxpayers is determined to be pricing unreasonably. However, this authority has
never been exercised. Christopher Rowland, Trump administration makes it easier for drugmakers to
profit from publicly funded coronavirus drugs, advocates say, WASH. POST (July 1, 2020, 4:43 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/01/vaccine-coronavirus-barda-trump/.
79 Zaitchik, supra note 77.
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National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP), a federal program
designed to take financial responsibility for reactions that are possibly caused by
a vaccination.80
Encouraging the private sector to enter the pharmaceutical industry is not
inherently bad; However, regarding an issue as broad and unique as public
health, it is wrong to assume that the private sector will not take advantage of
profit opportunities at the expense of public health. Despite the pro-pharma
regulation, the federal government has always played an important role in the
pharmaceutical industry. Between 2010 and 2016, every single medicine
approved by the FDA involved government or university laboratories.81 But the
amount of government funding for vaccines in the United States has decreased
and flattened consistently since the 1960s. The National Science Foundation has
found that, for the first time since World War II, federal funding makes up less
than 50% of basic research.82
II. COVID-19 AND THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT

The increase in private investment in the pharmaceutical industry has been
a result of increased opportunity for profit, but this has resulted in taking on
much more risk that ultimately is taken on by customers through higher pricing.
To prioritize public health, there needs to be an increase in government funding
as well as more structured regulation to create limitations or caps on certain
methods of profit. One of the solutions for this in recent years for this has been
the creation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the pharmaceutical industry.
Put simply, PPPs offer an opportunity to pool resources and add caveats to
intellectual property protections through agreements with the government.
PPPs have long been present in other industries such as construction, but
only recently have they begun to be recognized for their potential in the
pharmaceutical business. The pharmaceutical industry has always suffered from
a disconnect between the public and private sectors. Few private companies are
willing to engage in vaccine research and development as a result of costly
investment and high risk for return, and public organizations lack the capacity
to complete the process of either developing or manufacturing without the help
of the private sector.83 The economic reluctance of the private sector is not
surprising. As explained by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) Director Dr. Anthony Fauci, “[c]ompanies that have the skill
to be able to [produce and manufacture vaccines] are not going to just sit around
and have a warm facility, ready to go for when [the government] need[s] it.”84
80 This likelihood is determined by a table of known adverse reactions. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, Immunization Policy Issues Overview (Feb. 26, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/immunizations-policy-issues-overview.aspx.
81 Zaitchik, supra note 77.
82 Jeffrey Mervis, Data check: U.S. government share of basic research funding falls below 50%,
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE (Mar. 9, 2017, 1:15 PM),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/03/data-check-us-government-share-basic-research-fundingfalls-below-50.
83 Rutschman, supra note 6, at 731.
84 Florko, supra note 63. This comment is describing in particular the unwillingness of manufacturers
to build and prepare the facilities necessary for vaccine production until a vaccine has been approved.
See generally Seth Berkley, COVAX explained, GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR VACCINES AND
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Furthermore, there is often concern that the public sector will not be able to
guarantee the confidentiality of important industry information, or that
contracting and regulatory procedures will be more complex than their worth.85
On the public side, especially in the United States, many federal agencies have
responsibility for and power to influence vaccine production, but lack a central
framework for overarching policy and concrete objectives.86
The emergence of PPPs is a somewhat modern solution to the problems
surrounding fully private or fully public vaccine development. PPP models
began to enter the global health arena in the early 2000s.87 The two general
models that exist are access partnerships and product development partnerships.
Access partnerships rely on gathering resources in order to guarantee the
purchase and distribution of biopharmaceuticals.88 These partnerships place an
emphasis on the distribution of existing drugs. Product development
partnerships, on the other hand, focus more on the research and development of
new vaccines and drugs that are underfunded and have insufficient demand.89
The benefit of these partnerships is the jump-start the public funding can provide
to private industry or vice versa, and the balance of sharing information for the
good of global public health while retaining a worthwhile return on investment.90
The expertise required in vaccine development is typically found either in
academia or the public sector.91 The private sector often brings to the table
funding and skills applied in developing safe and effective products for the
market as well as experience and facilities to enable large-scale production.92
Distinct from other international or philanthropic organizations, PPPs create an
opportunity for high-level funding of certain high-risk and costly initiatives.93
One of the greatest benefits of these PPPs is their ability to pool together multiple
resources with varying strengths and skills toward a common goal: namely,
creating a lower cost-benefit ratio for vaccine development and distribution for
certain neglected diseases.94
IMMUNIZATIONS (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covax-explained (“To avoid
this, the Facility is working with manufacturers to provide investments and incentives to ensure that
manufacturers are ready to produce the doses we need as soon as a vaccine is approved.”).
85 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (US) DIVISION OF HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION,
AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION, COORDINATION, AND COLLABORATION IN
VACCINE POLICY (1985), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK216816/.
86 Id.
87 Rutschman, supra note 5, at 179.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 180.
90 HANNAH KETTLER & ADRIAN TOWSE, PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT: MEDICINES AND VACCINES FOR DISEASES OF POVERTY 8 (2002).
91 NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, A REVIEW OF PUBLIC–
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP ACTIVITIES IN HEALTH SYSTEM STRENGTHENING (2016).
92 NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, THE ROLE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS IN HEALTH SYSTEMS STRENGTHENING: WORKSHOP SUMMARY (Jill Jenson ed., 2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK373286/.
93 Wheeler & Berkley, supra note 67, at 729.
94 Id. The Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) is an example of the way a PPP has allowed for the
advancement of knowledge against a neglected disease. Malaria is a disease that predominantly
affects the poor, and as such does not offer high profitability. The private sector will not fight Malaria
alone because they need to make a profit. Similarly, the public sector cannot take on Malaria alone
because it does not have the know-how. A PPP, on the other hand, allows for action on several fronts
and with several parties. A PPP can receive knowledge that no one else has because it is concentrated
on one specific disease. What Advantages Do Public-Private Partnerships Such As MMV Bring to the
Development of New Antimalarial Drugs?, MEDICINES FOR MALARIA VENTURE (2010),
https://www.mmv.org/newsroom/interviews/what-advantages-do-public-private-partnerships-such-
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The value and necessity of the government in these PPPs cannot go
unnoticed. As expected, COVID-19 has required the government to invest
billions of dollars into the search for a vaccine. As of March 1, 2021, Moderna
had received $954 million in federal funding for development alone, and another
$4.94 billion for a contract of 300 million doses.95 The federal government’s
Health and Human Services (HHS) agency alone had obligated or spent about
$13.8 billion in coronavirus vaccine funding.96 This type of federal funding
places a significant portion of the cost on the federal government, allowing
investment that the private sector alone would never risk. As a result, the pricing
of these vaccines, in theory, could be lower and still turn a profit for these private
business investments.97 Some large companies that have developed a vaccine,
such as Johnson & Johnson and GlaxoSmithKline PLC, have announced that
they plan to make the vaccine available at cost, temporarily forgoing a profit.98
There are other factors that may temporarily be affecting price. Due to the
pandemic crisis across the globe, governments have made significant purchases,
some far beyond what is necessary, of vaccines that are not yet in existence in
an effort to be first in line. The reasoning is that, if a government must overestimate or under-estimate vaccine purchases, it is certainly better to overshoot.
It seems that, by buying in such large quantities, a price ceiling has been created
for the time being.99 But it is likely, if not guaranteed, that in the future these
prices will increase as insurance companies and other buyers begin to emerge.
Another way this profit will likely be realized is in the event that the vaccine
requires annual booster shots, similar to the annual influenza vaccine. As of
February 9, 2021, Pfizer had charged $19.50 per coronavirus vaccine dose, while
Moderna had charged $15 per dose, a total of $30 due to the two-dose
requirement.100 Moderna is the only company that has relied on almost complete
government funding, but it also requires storage temperatures that create a high
maintenance cost.
mmv-bring-development-new.
95 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN11560, OPERATION WARP SPEED CONTRACTS FOR COVID-19
VACCINES AND ANCILLARY VACCINATION MATERIALS (Mar. 1, 2021). In describing the speed at
which Moderna has developed the vaccine, CEO Stephane Bancel stated that Moderna “couldn’t have
done this” without such funding. Kevin Stankiewicz, Moderna Soars After Getting $483 Million in
Federal Funding for Coronavirus Vaccine Development (Apr. 17, 2020, 8:26 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/17/moderna-soars-on-483-million-in-funding-for-coronavirusvaccine.html.
96 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN11556, FUNDING FOR COVID-19 VACCINES: AN OVERVIEW (Jan. 11,
2021),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11556#:~:text=According%20to%20a%20Governm
ent%20Accountability,the%20rest%20in%20BARDA%20allocations.
97 It is necessary to note that the apparent counter argument would be that by increasing government
funding and decreasing private investment, this would result in a cumulative price increase for
taxpayers. While this is possible, the benefit of having government funding is potential for extra
resources as well as contractual price limitations that, when balanced with private investment, would
counteract the marked-up prices that are made possible by Big Pharma.
98 Julie Steenhuysen, Peter Eisler, et al., Special Report: Countries, Companies Risk Billions in Race
for Coronavirus Vaccine, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2020, 3:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ushealth-coronavirus-vaccine-specialrep-idUSKCN2270U1. However, these companies also stand to
see nonfinancial gains, as this may improve reputation and boost shares, which may contribute to a
financial gain in the future.
99 It should be noted that there have been other significant philanthropic and private contributions,
including the Gates Foundation, Alibaba founder Jack Ma, and country music singer Dolly Parton.
100 Jonathan Gardner, As COVID-19 Becomes A Business, Vaccine Makers Confront Thorny Pricing
Questions, BIOPHARMA DIVE (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/coronavirusvaccines-pricing-questions-moderna-pfizer/594762/.
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The COVID-19 vaccine could not have been produced as quickly as it has
without immense government funding. These funds have allowed manufacturing
facilities to build and prepare for the approval of vaccines so that they may be
manufactured immediately after approval. Though this involvement has cost
billions of taxpayer dollars, it has sped up the process of development, which
will save many lives as well as other economic expenses. Furthermore, the
government has purchased vaccines in bulk quantities that will be provided to
the American public at no cost.101
III. DISTRIBUTION AND THE NEED FOR A STRONG INTERNATIONAL PLAYER

Even if government funding creates a more affordable vaccine, distribution
remains an issue. On a domestic and practical level, the distribution of vaccines
presents costly maintenance concerns. Many vaccines, especially “live virus”
vaccines, require specific temperature maintenance.102 Many countries simply
cannot afford this type of vaccine maintenance. However, even many of the
countries that have been able to afford such cold chain technology have been
unable to care for the equipment properly or lacked the funding necessary for
staffing or some other form of cold chain maintenance.103 Supply and
availability of many products are necessary for a smooth distribution process.104
There are also concerns over improper disposal of biohazard waste, a shortage
of trained professionals to inoculate populations, a lack of a tracking system for
vaccinations provided (especially if multiple doses are required), and the
possibility of misinformation and mistrust in certain political climates.105
Furthermore, these domestic differences could have an international impact.
There are vast variances between countries in their ability to regulate and
distribute. It was not until 1972 that the United States created the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to regulate vaccine distribution and use, and the FDA
equivalents in many other countries took even longer.106 The way vaccines are
supplied has been changing in the globalized market as well. As developing
countries become more competent and skilled as vaccine manufacturers, they
are replacing the multinational firms that used to manufacture vaccines. For
101 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN11560, supra note 95.
102 See generally Vaccine Storage and Handling, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION:
THE PINK BOOK, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/vac-storage.html (last updated July
2020).
103 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO/IVB/14.05, IMMUNIZATION SUPPLY CHAIN AND LOGISTICS - A
NEGLECTED BUT ESSENTIAL SYSTEM FOR NATIONAL IMMUNIZATION PROGRAMMES, 1 (2014) (Table 1
lists some common challenges in vaccine distribution and maintenance). The Pfizer COVID-19
vaccine, for example, requires a constant temperature of negative 70-80 degrees Celsius. Jane Byrne,
COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution: Gaps Remain in Immunization Logistics and Real-Time Tracking of
Vaccine Storage and Demand, BIOPHARMA-REPORTER, https://www.biopharmareporter.com/Article/2020/11/19/COVID-19-vaccine-distribution-Gaps-remain-in-immunizationlogistics-and-real-time-tracking-of-vaccine-storage-and-demand (last updated Nov. 19, 2020, 9:47
AM GMT).
104 Bill Gates has warned of a shortage of medical glass, which may limit the number of vaccine doses
distributable. Sanger, Kirkpatrick, et al., supra note 16.
105 LAUNCH & SCALE SPEEDOMETER, https://launchandscalefaster.org/COVID-19 (last visited March
5, 2021).
106 Julie B. Milstien, Miloud Kaddar, & Marie Paule Kieny, The Impact of Globalization On Vaccine
Development And Availability, HEALTH AFFAIRS (July, 2006),
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.25.4.1061.
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infectious diseases such as the novel coronavirus and other future diseases, the
circumstances of globalization make the safety and health of all countries a
priority for each country.107 The emergence of a disease in one area of the world
does not limit treatment to that area. Globalization means that not only are the
economic effects of disease felt across the world, but the disease itself has the
ability to travel quickly. As the world begins to operate as a more interconnected
force in vaccine development and production, having a different regulatory
procedure at each step is inefficient and fails to adapt to a changing world.
Looking beyond domestic distribution challenges, one major challenge in
global health is the natural inclination toward nationalism over globalism, a
tension that has only heightened in recent years. Wealthy countries that have
companies with the means to develop a vaccine have indicated that they will
reserve a large number of initial doses strictly for national use.108 This is hardly
a blameworthy sentiment as no government would want to send the solution to
an existing national problem elsewhere in the world. However, this seems to
create a kind of prisoner’s dilemma. Each country operating only for itself may
take longer to succeed, losing lives domestically in the process, but also losing
lives internationally, damaging the global economy and harming political
relations. But countries do not want to do this because if they do not have power
and control over vaccine development, then they cannot ensure that vaccines go
to their people first.109
A. CHOOSE YOUR PLAYER
In order to improve the distribution efforts for vaccines, there needs to be a
central international authoritative power when it comes to distribution. There is
no single institution that has primary authority over vaccine development and
production on a global scale. One major reason for this is that private institutions
have monetary incentives to create these vaccines, and private risk in bearing the
costs allows for more research than would be possible in a strictly public sector
or government setting. However, because these private institutions are
contributing to global public health, there should be an international regulatory
system in place that includes and monitors the contributions of private
investment while still allowing the private sector to profit. Currently, there are a
few key international players involved in global health and vaccines.
On the international level, the most prominent health organization is the
World Health Organization (WHO). Founded in 1948, the WHO succeeded and
replaced the League of Nations’ Health Organization.110 The WHO has three
types of legislative instruments: conventions, regulations, and

107 Mellen, supra note 11.
108 Michaeleen Doucleff, How Rich Countries Are ‘Hoarding’ The World’s Vaccines, In Charts,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/12/03/942303736/how-rich-countries-are-hoarding- theworlds-vaccines-in-charts, (Canada, the U.S., the U.K., and Australia have all purchased vaccines doses
in numbers beyond 200% of their population).
109 Many countries have resorted to a zero-sum mentality, banning exports of many healthcare related
products such as masks and anti-viral drugs. Peter S. Goodman, Katie Thomas, et al., A New Front
for Nationalism: The Global Battle Against a Virus, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/business/coronavirus-vaccine-nationalism.html.
110 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO WE ARE, https://www.who.int/about/who-we-are/history.
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recommendations.111 However, the WHO has only ever created three binding
pieces of legislation. Two of these legally binding documents, the Nomenclature
Regulations, and the International Health Regulations, already had predecessors
before the WHO was originated.112 The only original and binding legislation the
WHO has ever enacted is the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC), which was adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) via a
requisite two-thirds vote in 2003.113 The FCTC is binding upon all member states
of the WHO (as long as they have not expressly opted out) and has been applied
in several domestic tobacco-related cases.114 The WHO has other non- binding,
but authoritative recommendations, the most notable of which is the
International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes (1981).115 When the
coronavirus had infected over 9,800 people, killed over 200, and Wuhan had
gone into quarantine, the WHO declared COVID-19 a Public Health Emergency
of International Concern (PHEIC) on January 31, 2020.116 This kind of
declaration can motivate state-level reactions on both a public and political level,
but it gives no additional power or resources to the WHO or any other
organization.117 In fact, the WHO had published an “R&D Blueprint” in which
it addressed the need for increased research and development, and specifically
acknowledged an “urgent need” for countermeasures against coronaviruses such
as MERS-CoV.118 Of course, that need was not sufficiently addressed until a
global pandemic was well underway.
Another key player is the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations
(Gavi) was founded in 2000 to specifically allow for public-private partnerships
to focus on international vaccines and immunizations. Gavi was founded with
the help of a $750 million investment and a 5-year pledge from the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation, and it has created partnerships with the WHO, the
World Bank, UNICEF, individual state governments, as well as private sector
partners.119 As a public-private partnership itself, Gavi is an example of an
access partnership, as much of its efforts go to improving vaccine access for both
111 Brigit Toebes, International health law: an emerging field of public international law, 55 INDIAN J.
OF INT’L L. 299, 305 (2015).
112 IWAO M. MORIYAMA, RUTH M. LOY, & ALASTAIR H.T. ROBB-SMITH, History of the Statistical
Classification of Diseases and Causes of Death 1–2 (Harry M. Rosenberg & Donna L. Hoyert eds.)
(2011), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/classification_diseases2011.pdf; WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
Frequently Asked Questions About the International Health Regulations (2005),
https://www.who.int/ihr/about/FAQ2009.pdf.
113 MORIYAMA, supra note 112, at 306.
114 Id. See also WORLD HEALTH ORG. CONSTITUTION, Art. 22. It should also be noted that though the
FCTC has 181 parties that are bound to its rules, it is often considered a sui generis treaty because the
tobacco industry is widely accepted to be purely harmful to health. Lawrence O. Gostin, Devi
Sridhar, & Daniel Hougendobler, The Normative Authority of the World Health Organization, 129
PUB. HEALTH J. 854, 856 (2015).
115 Toebes, supra note 111, at 307. Though the WHO has very little binding legal documents, there is
an argument that these non-binding recommendations can be more effective than mandatory law.
This is because states may be more inclined to accept such non-binding documents and, despite a
non-binding nature, may have more irrevocable effects in practice. See generally Oscar Schachter,
The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 296–304 (1977).
116 A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, AMERICAN J. MANAGED CARE (Jan. 1, 2021),
https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020.
117 Lawrence O. Gostin, What Questions Should Global Health Policy Makers Be Asking About The
Novel Coronavirus?, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Feb. 3, 2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200203.393483/full/.
118 WORLD HEALTH ORG., AN R&D BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION TO PREVENT EPIDEMICS (2016),
https://www.who.int/blueprint/about/r_d_blueprint_plan_of_action.pdf?ua=1.
119 GAVI, ABOUT OUR ALLIANCE, https://www.gavi.org/our-alliance/about.
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new and underused vaccines.120 One of the most recent public-private
partnerships and international organizations that aims specifically to improve the
vaccine development arena is the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness
Innovations (CEPI), a Norwegian association founded in 2017 that focuses on
public-private partnerships with the goal of putting a stop to future epidemics.121
Like Gavi, CEPI is a PPP, but CEPI also allocates significant efforts toward
product development. CEPI’s two main foci are accelerating the development
process of vaccines and facilitating equitable access of vaccines for all.122
Notably, CEPI agreed to provide financial support for the research and
development of three different types of COVID-19 vaccines in January of 2020,
just two weeks after scientists in China made a genome sequence of COVID-19
publicly available.123
One noteworthy aspect of CEPI is all contributing investors in CEPI are
invited to join CEPI’s Investors Council, which is responsible for nominations
of investor representatives to the Board.124 This includes private investors.125
Four of the Board’s twelve seats are selected by and reserved for members of
the Investors Council.126 This is in stark contrast to the World Health
Organization’s system of governance, which only allows states to become
members and the scope of influence for nonstate actors that invest in the WHO
is limited to earmarking their donation amounts for specific purposes.127 Another
unique aspect of CEPI is its approach to intellectual property and licensing.
CEPI’s general rule is it prefers for intellectual property to belong to the awardee
of a grant.128
One attempt to resolve the distribution problem has been through
COVAX.129 Founded in early 2020 by Gavi, CEPI, and the WHO in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic, COVAX is a project that aims to provide COVID-19
vaccine access to developing countries and high-risk populations around the
world.130 COVAX acts as a platform for a multitude of vaccine candidates,
120 Rutschman, supra note 5, at 179.
121 COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS, WHY WE EXIST, supra note 71. See
generally COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS, WHO WE ARE,
https://cepi.net/about/whoweare/ (“CEPI was founded in Davos by the governments of Norway and
India, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Welcome, and the World Economic Forum.” It has
received funding from a number of countries, though the United States is not one, and a number of
private sector entities).
122 COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS, WHY WE EXIST, supra note 71.
123 Rutschman, supra note 5, at 178.
124 COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS, INVESTORS COUNCIL TERMS OF
REFERENCE, 1 (2019), https://cepi.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/IC_Terms-of-referenceFeb2019_final-valid.pdf.
125 COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS, POLICY ON GOVERNING CONTRIBUTIONS
FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND FROM INDIVIDUALS, 1, 2 (2020), https://cepi.net/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/Policy-on-contributions-from-the-private-sector-andindividuals_website.pdf (“The CEPI Board can, with the consent of the CEPI Investors Council,
accept financial contributions that will result in the funder being invited to join the CEPI Investors
Council”).
126 COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS, supra note 125.
127 Lawrence O. Gostin & Allyn L. Taylor, Global Health Law: A Definition and Grand Challenges, 1
PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 53–63 (2008).
128 CEPI, CEPI POLICY DOCUMENTATION, 1, 3 (2017), https://msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/201809/CEPIoriginalPolicy_2017.pdf (However, the caveat is awardees may be required to allow
information to be accessible to third parties “through a non-exclusive, royalty-free, sub-licensable,
worldwide license.”); Id. at 9.
129 Mellen, supra note 11.
130 Sam Meredith, ‘Rule of the Jungle’: Health Expert Sounds the Alarm on Fair Access to Covid
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providing funding for the development of vaccines and guaranteeing access to
countries. For wealthier countries that are self-financing, assurance of access to
vaccines depends on donation levels. Their goal is to distribute two billion doses
of coronavirus vaccines before the end of 2021.131 Furthermore, COVAX is
attempting to accelerate the production process by incentivizing and investing
in manufacturers to be prepared before a vaccine is approved.132
As of October 19, 2020, 184 countries had joined the initiative, but the U.S.
was not one of them.133 As of October 11, 2021, that number increased to 190
with the inclusion of the U.S.134 Though many wealthy countries have promised
to support COVAX, they are also making deals with vaccine distributors to
receive a high quantity of doses for their own use.135 These deals limit the
number of doses available to COVAX to the point that only 10% to 15% of the
populations of countries in need are likely to receive a vaccine, though
COVAX’s goal has been to provide vaccines to a minimum of 20% of the
populations of countries in need.136 As of December 4, 2020, researchers at Duke
University’s Global Health Innovation Centre found that 9.85 billion doses of
COVID-19 vaccines had been purchased or reserved before any vaccine had
even been approved for market.137 Unfortunately, these countries have also
purchased vaccines in quantities well over the size of their population.138 The
reason they do this is that it is likely some of these vaccines will not receive
approval to go to market, but this overshooting usually leads to an oversupply of
doses. But wealthy countries that buy excess quantities of vaccines for their
population, often leaving vaccines to spare, is a recurring global trend.139 This
was the case during the H1N1 and H5N1 outbreaks, where the outbreaks
subsided before the vaccine became necessary and therefore eliminated a need
for any distributive sharing system.140 For the coronavirus vaccine, Canada has
already purchased a quantity over five times that of its population.141 One of the
most promising qualities of COVAX is it operates as a single source to which
countries can donate excess vaccines. However, this frustrates the purpose of
Vaccines, CNBC (Nov. 16, 2020, 9:01 AM EST), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/16/coronavirushealth-expert-says-vaccine-race-akin-to-law-of-the-jungle.html.
131 Julia Belluz, 171 Countries Are Teaming Up for a Covid-19 Vaccine. But Not the US, VOX (Oct. 9,
2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/21448719/covid-19-vaccine-covax-who-gavi-cepi.
132 Seth Berkley, COVAX Explained, COVAX (Sep. 3, 2020),
https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covax-explained.
133 WHO Says 184 Countries Have Now Joined COVAX Vaccine Program, VOA NEWS (Oct. 19, 2020,
4:39 PM), https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/who-says-184-countries-have-now-joinedcovax-vaccineprogram#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20is%20not,program%2C%20calling%20it%20too%20
constraining. (This was a notable exception and a risky gamble, as the U.S. was essentially
eliminating any chance of receiving doses from promising candidates associated with COVAX.
According to Kendal Hoyt, an assistant professor at Dartmouth’s Geisel School of Medicine, this was
a “short sighted” decision similar to opting out of an insurance policy); Emily Rauhala & Yasmeen
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WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2020, 2:42 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/coronavirus-vaccinetrump/2020/09/01/b44b42be-e965-11ea-bf44-0d31c85838a5_story.html.
134 Hannah Kettler, What is COVAX?, PATH (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.path.org/articles/what-covax/.
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COVAX in its efforts to distribute vaccines globally and opens up a new list of
possible pitfalls in the accumulation and maintenance of vaccines. As University
of Oxford researcher Sandy Douglas has put it, “The only solution is to make a
hell of a lot of vaccine[s] in a lot of different places.”142
B. ADDING EGGS TO THE COVAX BASKET
COVAX has been an important development in global public health, but
because it was established quickly and in response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
there is much room for improvement. One of the most obvious areas of potential
is that COVAX should not only be responsible for the distribution of vaccines,
but also the development of them. COVAX has impressively orchestrated the
participation of the majority of the world’s sovereign states in a matter of
months, with the alluring promise of providing vaccines based on ability to pay.
In the coming years, rather than using funds to purchase vaccines from other
companies and organizations, COVAX should establish its own development
process. Furthermore, perhaps with the help of the International Council for
Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
(ICH), which is focused on harmonizing and standardizing the domestic
regulatory systems of sovereign states, COVAX can ultimately develop an
international regulatory system for vaccine development and licensing.
Moreover, there should be payment requirements in order to proactively fund
vaccine development. This could be through membership dues, whether to
COVAX itself or as an extension of WHO membership dues. Because the nature
of vaccine market demand is such that there is often little incentive to invest in
vaccine production, especially for lesser-known diseases and those diseases that
affect lower-income countries, the concept of COVAX has an opportunity to
provide preemptive and practical investment that benefits each paying member.
Additionally, the development of Gavi and CEPI has been beneficial to
public health but act as a second and third voice competing with the WHO.
Though they largely work together, these three organizations require a more
central, guiding force. The United Nations (UN) Security Council is an example
of a powerful, legally binding force that exists within the United Nations.143 The
UN General Assembly offers what is more similar to the WHO’s Assembly; that
is, influential but nonbinding recommendations. The UN Security Council is
made up of five permanent members: France, Russia, China, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Pursuant to Article 23 of the UN Charter, there
are an additional six nonpermanent members at any given time that are elected
for two-year terms.144 The WHO currently lacks such an authoritative division,
but the nature of global vaccine distribution requires a commanding force that
supersedes the demands of individual countries. Paired with an authoritative
group such as the UN Security Council model, COVAX may be able to combine
both carrot and stick incentives.
CONCLUSION

142 Sanger, Kirkpatrick, et al., supra note 16.
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The importance of a strong international organization that is ultimately
responsible for international vaccine development, regulation, and distribution
has become evident. Despite having two years to restructure incentives and take
advantage of the global spotlight on the vaccination system, the world has
largely failed to create effective change. As the virus continues to infect, it is
presented with more opportunities to mutate into versions of itself that are less
responsive to existing vaccines, known as variants. The last couple of years have
seen the emergence of many variants, some of which have been labeled variants
of concern, which are more likely to cause breakthrough infections or
reinfections of COVID-19.145 As of January 4, 2022, the U.S. has experienced
over one million new cases per day, likely a result of the more resistant and
transmissible omicron variant.146 As of January 15, 2022, the total COVID-19
death toll is estimated at over 5.5 million worldwide, and this is not considering
the likely massive under-reporting happening for various reasons relating to
political incentives and reporting methods.147 This high death toll is certainly
related to the inequality in vaccine accessibility.148 Not only does this mean
many of these deaths were preventable, but in a globalized world unprevented
deaths are detrimental to all on both a public health and economic front.
The unfolding of the COVID-19 pandemic has made it clear that the unique
nature of vaccines is such that the private sector cannot be left to its own devices.
It is rational that the private sector is interested only in turning a profit, just as it
is rational that the U.S. and other domestic governments will scramble to ensure
the safety of their own citizens even if at the detriment of others. This has been
seen recently with the EU’s (as well as other countries’) opposition to the TRIPS
waiver, which would waive certain intellectual property rights related to the
development of COVID-19 vaccines.149 It is because of this global attitude that
WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has called the global
situation a “vaccine apartheid.”150
To maximize vaccine production and distribution efforts, there needs to be
an international and overarching source of power. COVAX offers significant
potential in ensuring under-developed countries have access to vaccines, but it
is limited in that it currently focuses only on distribution efforts, and domestic
governments will continue to make deals outside of COVAX until their
145 Robert Bollinger & Stuart Ray, COVID Variants: What You Should Know, JOHNS HOPKINS
MEDICINE, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/a-newstrain-of-coronavirus-what-you-should-know (last updated Jan. 14, 2022).
146 Sam Meredith, ‘Rule of the Jungle’: Health Expert Sounds the Alarm on Fair Access to Covid
Vaccines, CNBC (Nov 16, 2020, 9:01AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/04/us-counts-over-1million-new-daily-covid-cases-in-global-record-.html.
147 Coronavirus Death Toll, WORLDOMETER https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/coronavirusdeath-toll/; https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8219996/ (last updated Jan. 16, 2022).
148 See generally Pablo Gutiérrez & Ashley Kirk, Vaccine Inequality: How Rich Countries Cut Covid
Deaths as Poorer Fall Behind, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2021, 10:08 BST),
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received at least one dose of a vaccine while every other continent has reached over 65%). Ritchie &
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population is fully vaccinated. Of course, COVAX is also currently a standalone program that can be opted into or left alone. While beneficial to join
in its current form, it has significant potential to develop a more
comprehensive international vaccine development and distribution
program.
With a central force, there are ways global public health can be
encouragedand ensured. A single source can support initiatives in wealthy
countries and should encourage its member states by supporting their
individual, and nationalendeavors to improve the health of their citizens.
Mutually, member states should be encouraged and incentivized to
implement policies that go beyond domestic issues. Countries cannot be
required to join an international organization. But in the same way that it
would be politically detrimental for a country to leave the United Nations,
there should be incentives for member states to want to be a part of an
international vaccination system.
Global public health is recognized by individual states as an important
development to advance, but rather than having direct monetary incentives
likethe work of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the pursuit of global
public health is more similar to environmental law in that the return on
investment is not always clear. However, the state of the globalized world
is such that the status of vaccinations in one country creates an impact in
every other country. Unlike more altruistic aims such as ending starvation
and treating chronic disease, the futures of all nations are mutually linked by
infectious diseases. Allcountries have self-serving reasons to ensure global
vaccinations and prevent viral mutations. Therefore, there should be a
vaccine-specific source of power responsible for ensuring vaccines are
distributed globally and equitably. Countries could be incentivized by
grants, tax cuts, or alternative reimbursementplans, organized and provided
by an international organization and managed on individual state levels.
Though the specific answers about how to achieve this are unclear, and there
will undoubtedly be many more questions about ensuring vaccine
distribution on the state and individual level, the most important takeaway
is the unique condition of the vaccine development industry, and the
importance of an international authority responsible for ensuring global
vaccinations. Government is a necessity in vaccine production, but only by
allowing for international control beyond domestic governments can the
needs of global vaccine production and distribution be met.

